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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it would seem that the
womb essentially marks the physical boundary in terms of a woman’s
choices, the consequences of which have the potential to significantly affect
her future. Consider a woman who finds herself pregnant. Perhaps she is in
graduate school and the prospect of having a child would interrupt her plans
to complete her education and her intended career path. Accordingly, she
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chooses to abort the baby, and the decision has constitutional approbation,
as decided by the United States Supreme Court.1 Now, however, imagine
that the same woman has carried her child to term, perhaps readjusting her
plans to include a career path that is more amenable to a working mother.
Because she will eventually be enrolling her child in school, she
makes sure she complies with compulsory vaccination mandates, even
though she is aware of the risks, because her child cannot be medically exempted from vaccinations and she does not hold religious beliefs contrary
to the practice. Further, imagine that her child is injured during a routine
round of vaccinations, and the result is that she now cannot procure or cannot afford the type of care that her child requires. Her career plans have
been altered, perhaps indefinitely. Yet, her situation has never been contemplated in the framework of the right to privacy that guarantees her right
to terminate the pregnancy. With implications that may be as far reaching
as those visited upon a woman forced to have a child, perhaps it is time to
recognize the mother’s “right to choose” extending beyond the womb.
In 1973, the Supreme Court of the United States first declared that a
state could not interfere with a woman’s right to choose to terminate her
pregnancy.2 In this landmark decision, the Court recognized that while the
state did have a compelling interest in “potential life,” that interest could
only be said to coincide with the “point of viability,” such that a prohibition
on abortion before viability was unconstitutional.3 The Court overcame the
lack of an explicitly stated “right of privacy” by considering constitutional
provisions that contemplated “zones of privacy” in the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as in the “penumbras of the
Bill of Rights.”4 Justification for this newfound privacy right was articulated by asserting, “[m]aternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent.”5 Having determined that a woman’s right to an abortion was a matter
of privacy made the right to abortion one of a fundamental denomination,
such that any state interference with that right had to be “narrowly drawn to
express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”6
Aside from the issue of abortion, the Supreme Court has found that the
fundamental right of privacy exists in cases involving the formation of marital/familial relationships,7 an individual’s right to privacy concerning her
1.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2.
Id.
3.
Id. at 163.
4.
Id. at 152.
5.
Id. at 153.
6.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
7.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that anti-miscegenation
laws intrude upon individual privacy); see also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499
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sexual orientation,8 a right to privacy in the matter of birth control materials,9 and, of particular importance to the topic at hand, a parent’s right to
decide how his or her children should be raised.10
By recognizing that parents “have the right, coupled with the high duty”11 to prepare their children for the future, the Supreme Court has conveyed the message that the choices parents make about how their children
are raised are theirs to make and the consequences of those choices are
theirs to bear. Considering that it would be unjust to require that parents
bear the consequences of decisions affecting their children that they had
little or no discretion in making, there is a strong basis for great deference
to parental discretion in these matters.12 Accordingly, the right to choose
not to vaccinate one’s children, when the practice poses a risk of injury
and/or death, should be deemed fundamental under a right to privacy analysis. Part II of this Comment will discuss the current state of vaccination
law, existing exemptions, and the attendant concerns of some parents. Part
III of this Comment will explore how a blanket substitution of philosophical exemptions for religious exemptions will cure Equal Protection Clause
problems. Part IV will lay out the argument that vaccination exemption
rights should be deemed fundamental under the Due Process Clause, abortion jurisprudence, and the Supreme Court’s holdings in family autonomy
cases.
II.
A.

THE CURRENT STATE OF VACCINATION PRACTICES

AVAILABLE EXEMPTIONS AND THEIR CRITERIA

There are three types of vaccine exemptions: medical, religious, and
philosophical.13 In all fifty states, a medical exemption from compulsory

(1977) (holding that a state may not interfere with the right of related persons to form a
household in a way that contravenes existing zoning ordinances).
8.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (finding that a right to privacy
between consenting adults prohibits state interference in such interactions).
9.
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (holding that the state
cannot interfere in the sexual relationships of consenting adults by way of birth control regulation).
10.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (holding that parents have the
right to determine educational instruction of their children); see also Troxel v. Granville, 538
U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (holding that parents have a right to privacy in determining care and
custody issues where they have proven to be fit custodians).
11.
Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 535 (1925).
12.
See id.
13.
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-303(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2009) (an example
of a medical exemption from vaccination regulations); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 695.30
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vaccination is available.14 It is worth noting, however, that the criteria for
medical exemptions can vary from state to state; some states simply require
a certification from the child’s physician “stating that due to the physical
condition of the student one or more specified immunizations would endanger the student’s life or health,”15 while another state, for instance, allows
that the licensed physician’s certification “may be accepted by the local
health officer when, in his opinion, such exemption will not cause undue
risk to the community.”16 The magnitude of difference between these approaches is significant; the former approach provides a great degree of protection for a child whose doctor has determined that the benefits of vaccines
are contraindicated for that particular child due to some physiological/biological factor,17 while the latter approach subjugates a child to the
determination of the local health officer without defining what constitutes
“undue risk,” the basis for which an exemption will be denied, even though
a child’s physician believes vaccinations are contraindicated in that particular instance.18 Furthermore, parents in Mississippi cannot circumvent the
requisite local health official approval (of medical exemption from compulsory vaccination) by sending their children to private schools since the law
applies to both public and private schools.19 (The only option available to
parents whose child has been deemed medically unfit for vaccinations by
the child’s physician, yet who have failed to attain approbation of the local
health official, is to educate their child at home,20 an option that may not be
possible for all families so situated.) In both Mississippi and West Virginia,
the only available exemption from vaccination is the medical exemption.21
Exemption from compulsory vaccination for religious reasons is an
option available in all states, with the exceptions of Mississippi, West Virginia,22 and California (where the option of a philosophical exemption renders a religious one moot).23 Not all religious exemptions are created equal,
though. In some states, legislatures have opted for an adherence to a more
(2011) (an example of a religious exemption); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-873 (2009) (an
example of a philosophical exemption).
14.
Vaccine
Laws,
NAT’L
VACCINE
INFO.
CENTER
(NVIC),
http://www.nvic.org/vaccine-laws.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
15.
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-302(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2009).
16.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-37 (2009).
17.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-302(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2009).
18.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-37 (2009).
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
State
Vaccination
Exemptions,
NAT’L VACCINE INFO. CENTER,
http://www.nvic.org/CMSTemplates/NVIC/images/state-exemptions2.pdf (last visited Oct.
3, 2011).
22.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-37 (2009); W. VA. CODE § 16-3-4 (2007).
23.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit.17, § 6051 (2006).
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stringent standard, requiring that the parent belong to a specific church that
teaches against vaccination in order to qualify.24 Yet other states (the majority of them that allow for religious exemptions) have allowed for a more
liberal application, requiring only that the parent state that he or she objects
to vaccinations based upon personally held religious beliefs, satisfied by
sending a letter to the local school authority.25
While the wording varies in the different states’ statutes that excuse
compulsory vaccination on a philosophical basis, the requirements for this
exemption are rather uniform in that all that is required is a letter or affidavit from the parent stating that he or she asserts objections to vaccinations
based upon “the conscientiously held beliefs,”26 “philosophical or personal”27 reasons, or other similar wording. There may be a heightened requirement to qualify for a philosophical exemption, however, as illustrated by
Arizona’s requirement that philosophical exemption-seekers must attest to
the fact that they have “received information about immunizations provided
by the department of health services and understand[] the risks and benefits
of immunizations and the potential risks of nonimmunization and that due
to personal beliefs, the parent or guardian does not consent to the immunization of the pupil.”28 Such provision is akin to what one commentator
refers to as “informed refusal.”29
B.

REASONS FOR ASSERTION EXEMPTION RIGHTS OUTSIDE OF MEDICAL
NECESSITY

1.

Reasons Relating to Religion

The provision for religious objection exemptions30 reflects two things:
there are religious organizations that teach against vaccinations, as is the
case with Jehovah’s Witnesses;31 additionally, some religious exemptions
provide for the recognition of religious opposition to the practice of vac24.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5209(b)(2) (2002).
25.
See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 695.30 (2011).
26.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.15(3)(d) (West 2008 & Supp. 2011).
27.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.210.090(3) (West 2011).
28.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-873 (2009).
29.
Ross D. Silverman, No More Kidding Around: Restructuring Non-Medical
Childhood Immunization Exemptions to Ensure Public Health Protection, 12 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 277, 294 (2003) (proposing that exemption status be predicated upon consultation, documentation, and meaningful discussion about the risks of choosing not to vaccinate
one’s child).
30.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5209(b)(2) (2002).
31.
See
Jehovah’s
Witnesses,
Past
Opposition
to
Vaccinations,
RELIGIOUSTOLERANCE.ORG, http://www.religioustolerance.org/witness6.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2011) (discussing how Jehovah’s Witnesses formerly condemned the practice, but
have since retracted an outright prohibition, leaving it up to the individual to decide).
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cination,32 even when those religious beliefs are not founded on the teachings of a particular church.33 Furthermore, there exists a rationale for asserted religious opposition to specific vaccinations when, as some vaccinechoice proponents argue, the particular vaccine has been attenuated in
aborted fetal tissue.34 This is not disputed by pro-vaccine advocates—the
use of aborted fetal tissue is simply justified by pointing out that the fetal
tissue used for attenuation derived from only two aborted babies, named
only for the cell strains as “WI-38” and “MRC-5” that have been used for
“more than 35 years” for vaccine production.35 Because the practice of
abortion is considered to be “intrinsically evil” by certain religious organizations, affiliated bioethics advocates have insisted that a believer “under
direct teaching of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church has the absolute
right to refuse any medical products derived from aborted fetal tissue, including vaccinations . . . .”36
2.

Reasons Relating to Safety

The potential for adverse reactions is not merely a battle cry promulgated by the vaccine choice crowd; rather, there is a formalized governmental program “under which compensation may be paid for a vaccine-related
injury or death.”37 The program was established with two objectives: to
promote “optimal prevention of human infectious diseases through immunization and to achieve optimal prevention against adverse reactions to vaccines.”38 The program was henceforth called the “National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program (NVICP),”39 and it provided compensation through
the federal court system (presided over by special masters),40 with damages
funded by federally collected taxes on vaccines,41 and with a $1000 limit on
any cause of action claimed against a vaccine manufacturer.42 Since 1989 to
date, the program has paid out over two billion dollars in awards (including
32.
See, e.g., 77 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit 77, § 695.30 (2011).
33.
See, e.g., Dalli v. Bd. of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219, 220 (Mass. 1971).
34.
E.g.,
VACCINATION
INFO.
&
CHOICE
NETWORK,
http://www.nccn.net/~wwithin/abortedtissue.htm (naming “rabies, mumps, rubella, chickenpox, hepatitis a, smallpox (some), ipv” as being “attenuated in diploid cells”).
35.
Human Fetal Links with Some Vaccines, NAT’L NETWORK FOR IMMUNIZATION
INFO.,
http://www.immunizationinfo.org/issues/vaccine-components/human-fetal-linkssome-vaccines (last visited Oct. 8, 2011).
36.
CHILD. OF GOD FOR LIFE, http://www.cogforlife.org/vaxexempt.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2011).
37.
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3758.
38.
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 (Supp. IV 1987).
39.
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 (Supp. IV 1987).
40.
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12 (Supp. IV 1987).
41.
I.R.C. § 9510 (LexisNexis 2011).
42.
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1987).
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attorney’s fees) to individuals, or their families, for vaccine-related injuries
and/or deaths.43
Particularly illustrative of parental leeriness towards vaccines, the
MMR (Measles, Mumps, Rubella) vaccine has been a source of concern
among some parents because of theories that the vaccine has a causal link
to autism.44 Critics assert that such hand-wringing is baselessly propagated
by reliance upon faulty science.45 Even the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), responsible for administering the NVICP states,
“HHS has never concluded in any case that autism was caused by vaccination.”46 This assertion was strongly underscored when the HHS dismissed
more than five thousand claims for vaccine-caused autism.47 Yet, there is a
single vaccine-related autism claim that HHS concluded to be compensable,48 which, as one recent article points out, “[t]he Poling concession left
unclear just how Hannah Poling [the one compensated autism claim] might
differ from the other five thousand claims of vaccine-induced autism . . .
.”49 The authors of the article further point out that while only one autismbased claim has been compensated, several other compensated individuals
had concurrent autistic or autistic-like symptoms in addition to a root injury
(in many instances encephalopathy) for which they were remunerated.50
Furthermore, the Institute of Medicine, in a report released on April 23,
2001, concluded that while there was no causal link between the MMR
vaccine and autism, “the committee notes that its conclusion does not exclude the possibility that MMR vaccine could contribute to ASD [autistic
spectrum disorders] in a small number of children . . . .”51

43.
Statistics Reports, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES HEALTH
RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN. (HRSA), http://www.hrsa.gov/nvicp/statisticsreports.html#2
(last visited Oct. 8, 2011) [hereinafter HRSA, Statistics Reports].
44.
Nancy Shute, Parents’ Vaccine Safety Fears Mean Big Trouble for Children’s
Health, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. HEALTH (Mar. 1, 2010), http://health.usnews.com/healthnews/blogs/on-parenting/2010/03/01/parents-vaccine-safety-fears-mean-big-trouble-forchildrens-health.
45.
See id.
46.
HRSA, Statistics Reports, supra note 43.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Mary Holland, Louis Conte, Robert Krakow & Lisa Colin, Unanswered Questions from the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: A Review of Compensated Cases of
Vaccine-Induced Brain Injury, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 480, 501 (2011) (reviewing multiple
cases of compensated vaccine injury victims and discovering eighty-three cases involving
concurrent diagnoses of autism, or at least autistic-like disorders).
50.
Id.
51.
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IMMUNIZATION SAFETY REVIEW: MEASLES-MUMPSRUBELLA VACCINE AND AUTISM 6 (Kathleen Stratton et al. eds., 2001), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10101&page=6.
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The uncertainty of the MMR-autism link, however, is certainly not
dispositive of other vaccine-related, compensable injuries.52 Anaphylaxis,
anaphylactic shock, encephalopathy, and encephalitis are among the most
common injuries listed; however, provisions for “any acute complication or
sequela (including death)”53 appear on the vaccine injury table.54 “The Table lists and explains injuries/conditions that are presumed to be caused by
vaccines.”55 A reaction’s absence from the table is not preclusive to filing a
claim; rather, the petitioner must prove his/her case, and is not afforded the
convenience of presumed causation.56
Beyond the faceless statistics published by the Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA) are the personal stories. In one account of
an adverse reaction to a diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DTP) shot, a
mother describes how her active and alert two-month-old transitioned over
the next thirty-three hours into a listless and unresponsive baby before dying.57 Particularly heart-wrenching in this mother’s story is that she relied
upon her doctor’s advice that her son was having a normal reaction to the
vaccine, when there were serious warning signs that—as she admits—
would have prompted her to seek medical attention were it not for her physician’s dismissive attitude.58 Stories such as this fuel vaccine-apprehensive
parents’ concerns, and rightly so.
3.

Failures in the Compensation Program

As a society, we embrace risk of all sorts from the routinely benign,
driving a car for instance, to the routinely hazardous, which may include
washing the windows on skyscrapers. The tool bolstering our ability to accept risks is insurance, which essentially “transfers, or shifts, risk from one
person or entity to another.”59 As one author notes, “[r]isk aversion helps
explain why someone pays an insurance premium today against the mere
possibility of suffering a loss in the future. A premium is a small, certain
loss that protects against having to bear the financial costs of a much larger
52.
53.

HRSA, Statistics Reports, supra note 43.
Vaccine Injury Table, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES HEALTH
RESOURCES
&
SERVICES
ADMIN.,
http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/vaccinetable.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2011)
[hereinafter HRSA, Vaccine Injury Table].
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
HARRIS L. COULTER & BARBARA LOE FISHER, A SHOT IN THE DARK 15-17
(1991).
58.
Id. at 18.
59.
TOM BAKER, INSURANCE AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 2 (2d
ed. 2008).
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loss in the future.”60 In terms of vaccination policy, one could postulate that
the existence of the NVICP and its compensation policy is the “insurance”
that allows for parents to engage the risk of vaccinating their children.
Whether or not the premium is “small”61 is a question for a separate discussion; pertinent to this Comment is an evaluation of what is given in return
for that premium: compliance with vaccination policy.
When the NVICP was established, it was constructed to be favorable
to both vaccine manufacturers—by funding awards from collected vaccine
taxes thereby absolving them of most vaccine liability62—and the individuals who had been injured by vaccines, and their families, by way of presumption of causation.63 In spite of the intent behind the legislation, some
vaccine-choice advocates have come to view the adjudication process
available through the program with bitter eyes.64 Furthermore, some critics
have accused the administration of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) of arbitrarily redefining compensable injuries like encephalopathy such that “petitioners . . . will never again see an injury to a child
that falls within the definition’s narrow confines.”65 Barbara Loe Fisher,
mother of a vaccine-injured son, and co-founder of the National Vaccine
Information Center (NVIC) (a vaccine-choice advocacy organization), reflects disdainfully upon how the NVICP in practice has diverged from the
program as proposed at the time of its inception:
We maintain that the spirit and intent of the law, as Congress and the public envisioned it, has not been fulfilled. In
our view, the principal reason for this failure of implementation is because the Department of Health and Human
Service, which was on record as opposing the passage of
this legislation (as was the Department of Justice), was given too much discretionary authority in the law to change
the rules for compensation after the law was passed.
Through the wielding of this discretionary authority, both
federal agencies have worked together to weaken the ability of vaccine injured claimants to obtain compensation.
60.
Id. (emphasis added).
61.
Id.
62.
I.R.C. § 9510 (LexisNexis 2011).
63.
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3758.
64.
Compensating Vaccine Injuries: Are Reforms Needed? Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Res., 106th Cong. 12 (1999)
(statement of Rep. Dan Burton, Chairman, H. Comm. on Gov’t. Reform).
65.
Barbara Loe Fisher, Compensating Vaccine Injuries: Are Reforms Needed?,
NAT’L VACCINE INFO. CENTER (Sept. 28, 1999), http://www.nvic.org/injurycompensation/congresstestimony.aspx (providing prepared testimony for a hearing by the
House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
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The net result has been the creation of an uneven playing
field that has often turned what was supposed to be a fairer,
expedited, less traumatic, less expensive, no-fault alternative to a lawsuit against vaccine manufacturers and administering physicians into a highly adversarial, lengthy, traumatic and unfair imitation of a lawsuit conducted in front
of a Special Master instead of a judge and jury.66
This assertion is bolstered by elected officials, such as Representative
Dan Burton (Indiana) who in 2002 stated, “[w]hile approximately 1,700
families have received compensation under this program, many families
have seen their cases tied up for years in a system that has become too contentious.”67 Furthermore, Fisher laments that the HHS has manipulated
standards in order to make compensation for vaccine-injured families illusory:
[O]ver time, the Secretary has primarily used her discretionary authority through the regulatory process to remove
compensable events from the Table sanctioned by Congress, and to redefine permanent injuries in the Aids to Interpretation long recognized by the medical community as
being associated with vaccine reactions. In the words of
one attorney for vaccine injured children, the Secretary’s
arbitrary redefinition of the medically recognized definition
of “encephalopathy” “is so restrictive that it is believed by
petitioners’ counsels across this country that they will never again see an injury to a child that falls within the definition’s narrow confines.”68
Given that “children today are required by law to receive thirty-three
doses of ten different viral and bacterial vaccines before entering kindergarten,”69 the potential for an adverse reaction is not negligible, and parents
who harbor doubts about the integrity of the compensation program may be
inclined to base their vaccination-related decision, at least in part, on those
alleged shortcomings. Considered along with the assertion that “[t]he FDA
and CDC have admitted that reported adverse events represent as few as 1-

66.
Id.
67.
The Continuing Oversight of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Hearing Before the Comm. on Gov’t. Reform, 107th Cong. 2 (2002) (statement of Dan
Burton, Chairman, H. Comm. on Gov’t. Reform).
68.
Fisher, Compensating Vaccine Injuries: Are Reforms Needed?, supra note 65.
69.
Barbara Loe Fisher, Vaccines: Finding a Balance Between Public Safety and
Personal Choice, FED. NEWS SERVICE, INC., Aug. 3, 1999.
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10% of the events actually occurring,”70 fears that drive parents to avoid
vaccinating their children may be validly attributable to deficiencies in the
NVICP.
4.

Questions About the Efficacy of Vaccines: Are Vaccines the Real Reason for the Decline in Childhood Diseases?

Considering the evidence that at least some children will be injured by
vaccines,71 parents inclined to reject vaccinations for their children may be
further influenced by arguments that the near eradication of childhood diseases cannot be attributed to vaccinations.72 For instance, Polio vaccination
practices were credited with the elimination of the disease in the United
States; however, critics question why Polio was also eradicated in Europe
where no “mass vaccination” campaign was employed.73 Furthermore, after
the Polio vaccine was introduced, Dr. Salk (credited with creating the Polio
vaccine) pointed out that the majority of the cases that subsequently developed were attributable to the Sabin [Polio] vaccine.74
Additionally, the number of people infected with measles in 1958 was
800,000; the number of people had fallen by 300,000 in 1962, the year before the “vaccine was introduced.”75 Contrasting the percentage of measlesrelated deaths in 1900 (13.3 deaths per 100,000 population)76 against the
death rate in 1955 (.03 deaths per 100,000), one critic states, “[t]hose numbers alone are dramatic evidence that measles was disappearing before the
vaccine was introduced.”77 Yet another critic points out that some diseases
virtually disappeared, “without any vaccines at all, such as typhoid fever,
scarlet fever, scurvy and tuberculosis.”78 If parents entertain doubts that
vaccines are really as effective as proponents claim, the attendant risks
may, for some, outweigh the purported benefits.

70.
Alan G. Phillips, The Moral and Ethical Imperative for Vaccine Philosophical
Exemptions,
VACCINERIGHTS.COM,
1,
http://www.vaccinerights.com/pdf/PhilosophicalExemption.pdf (last updated Aug. 12,
2011).
71.
HRSA, Statistics Reports, supra note 43.
72.
ROBERT S. MENDELSOHN, HOW TO RAISE A HEALTHY CHILD—IN SPITE OF YOUR
DOCTOR 210 (1984).
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 210-11.
75.
Id. at 216.
76.
Id.
77.
ROBERT S. MENDELSOHN, HOW TO RAISE A HEALTHY CHILD—IN SPITE OF YOUR
DOCTOR 210, 216 (1984).
78.
Phillips, supra note 70.
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CIRCUMVENTING THE SYSTEM WHEN EXEMPTIONS ARE LIMITED/NARROW

When medical exemptions are not applicable, and philosophical exemptions are unavailable, some parents have resorted to invoking religious
beliefs that they do not hold.79 Yet other parents in states that allow a religious exemption only for members of a particular faith have claimed to
subscribe to a “church,” the sole purpose of its establishment being to provide parents an avenue to successfully claim a religious exemption.80 Limiting exemptions to those medically necessary or based upon religious beliefs
may encourage dishonesty and a general degradation of religious beliefs.
SOLUTIONS: JETTISONING THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION AND ITS
III.
DEFECTS IN FAVOR OF THE NON-DISCRIMINATORY PHILOSOPHICAL
EXEMPTION
One argument promulgated by opponents to vaccine choice is that
statutory provisions establish a de facto violation of the Establishment
Clause.81 One author, reviewing court decisions that analyzed religiousbased vaccination exemptions stated, “[t]hese courts have ruled that permitting individuals that belong to religious groups that forbid vaccinations to
opt out of the vaccination requirement while requiring all other individuals .
. . to be vaccinated . . . is an example of the state providing privileges to
particular religious groups.”82 Furthermore, the author noted that the disparate approach of allowing the benefits of religious exemptions (whether under a narrowly written religious exemption or a broadly drafted one) to only
certain religions or generally those citing religion, results in violations of
the Equal Protection Clause.83 While states are generally free to accommodate religion,84 it is worth noting that inherent in this author’s argument is
the admission that being granted an opportunity to avoid vaccinations is
indeed a benefit. Given the concerns of some parents,85 that obscure admis79.
Steve Leblanc, Parents Use Religion to Avoid Vaccines, USA TODAY, Oct. 18,
2007, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-10-17-19819928_x.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
80.
Donald G. McNeil Jr., Worship Optional: Joining a Church to Avoid Vaccines,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/14/science/worship-optionaljoining-a-church-to-avoid-vaccines.html.
81.
Alicia Novak, Comment, The Religious and Philosophical Exemptions to StateCompelled Vaccination: Constitutional and Other Challenges, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW.
1101, 1113 (2005).
82.
Id.
83.
Id. at 1115.
84.
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 714 (1994)
(“[R]eligious needs can be accommodated through laws that are neutral with regard to religion.”).
85.
See infra Part III.B-D; supra Part II.B.
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sion (and the argument within which it is buried) bears weight and is illustrated in two cases that came out of two federal district courts: one from the
Western District of Arkansas and the other from the Eastern District of Arkansas.86 In the first of the two cases, McCarthy v. Boozman, the court stated:
Section 6-18-702(d)(2) also violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Members or adherents of a recognized church or denomination enjoy the benefit of an exemption that is denied to other persons whose
objections to immunization are also grounded in sincere religious belief. This preferred treatment of one group and
discrimination against the other can only result in a denial
of equal protection of the law. Accordingly, we hold that
the religious exemption provision is unconstitutional and
invalid.87
Ironically, McCarthy’s request for summary judgment was
granted, in that the court declared the religious exemption
was to be entirely stricken from the Arkansas Code; however, the court conceded, “[o]ur holding does not afford relief of any real value to the Plaintiff.”88 When, less than a
month later, a second religious exemption-related case was
decided in an Arkansas federal court, the court dismissed
the parent’s claim that compulsory vaccination mandates
violated her Free Exercise rights by stating, “[s]ubsection
(a) of the immunization statute does not target religious beliefs or seek to infringe upon or restrict certain practices
because of their religious motivation.”89 Essentially, these
two decisions meant that parents in Arkansas were left
without the option of invoking a religious exemption from
vaccinating their children because the exemption statute
failed “to pass muster under all three prongs of the test in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.”90 Interestingly, after these “anti-

86.
See McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945 (W.D. Ark. 2002); Boone v.
Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
87.
McCarthy, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 949 (emphasis added).
88.
Id. at 950.
89.
Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 953 (citing Church of Lukimi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 506 U.S. 520 (1992)).
90.
M. Craig Smith, Note, A Bad Reaction: A Look at the Arkansas General Assembly’s Response to McCarthy v. Boozman and Bonne v. Boozman, 58 ARK. L. REV. 251, 256
(2005) (“To pass muster under the Establishment Clause, it must be found that the exemp-
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choice” decisions were handed down, the Arkansas legislature redrafted their vaccine exemption statute, which now
asserts that the compulsory vaccination requirement “shall
not apply if the parents or legal guardian of that child object thereto on the grounds that immunization conflicts with
the religious or philosophical beliefs of that parent or
guardian.”91
One opponent criticized that “the Arkansas Legislature seemed to
completely abdicate the spirit of its former exemption,”92 and instead proposed that the statute would “pass constitutional muster by providing an
exemption based upon one’s good faith religious objections, ‘genuinely and
sincerely held,’ while still excluding those whose objections . . . were more
rooted in personal and philosophical, rather than religious beliefs.”93 Even
if an exemption were drafted according to the suggestion, it could be challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause because exempting out of
compulsory vaccinations is viewed as a benefit,94 and “governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First
Amendment.”95 Consider, for instance, that groups like the Atheist and Agnostic Pro-Life League96 exist. Surely a group with a number of members
who support the complete abolition of abortion without exception may be
equally as inclined as a pro-life Catholic97 to shun vaccines that have been
cultured in aborted fetal tissue.98 The denial of the benefit of rejecting a
vaccine for the aforementioned reasons certainly presents fertile soil for an
Equal Protection Clause claim. One critic argues that the better approach is
that which was taken by the Mississippi legislature. Abolishing the religious exemption altogether, he argues, would “benefit and better protect . . .
citizens.”99 The assertion, however, fails to address how a lack of available
exemptions better protects citizens for whom the very real risks of vaccination100 pose incredibly harsh choices.
tion serves a secular purpose, that its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and that the government is not excessively entangled with religion.”).
91.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-702(d)(4)(A).
92.
Smith, supra note 90, at 278.
93.
Id. at 278-79.
94.
See Novak, supra note 81.
95.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
96.
ATHEIST
AND
AGNOSTIC
PRO-LIFE
LEAGUE
HOMEPAGE,
http://www.godlessprolifers.org/home.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
97.
See CHILD. OF GOD FOR LIFE, supra note 36.
98.
Human Fetal Links with Some Vaccines, supra note 33.
99.
Smith, supra note 90, at 279-80 (explaining how the Mississippi legislature
“simply allowed the religious exemption to be severed and never reenacted a new one” after
its religious exemption was struck down in Brown v. Stone).
100.
See HRSA, Statistics Reports, supra note 43.
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While the Arkansas rewrite of the exemption statute101 effectively
eliminates any Establishment Clause, Equal Protection, or Free Exercise
claims, the same effect could have been achieved by striking any reference
to religious beliefs, and simply replacing it with a provision for philosophical beliefs. Some assert that allowing philosophical exemptions will lead to
higher rates of non-vaccination,102 yet one commentator posits that states
that allow philosophical exemptions could enjoy higher vaccination rates by
permitting parents to selectively exempt from certain vaccines unlike religious exemptions that are characteristically applied on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis.103
IV.
A.

WHY BOTHER? IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR
RECOGNIZING EXEMPTION RIGHTS?

THE DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT

All tiers of government are prohibited from depriving persons of life,
liberty, or property under constitutional amendments. The Fifth Amendment defines the scope of the federal government’s power to intrude upon
personal rights, stating, “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.”104 The Fourteenth Amendment similarly limits the power of the states: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .”105 Some
vaccine-choice advocates have argued that because the risk of death or injury (which may be characterized as a deprivation of life, whether complete
or partial) accompanies the practice of vaccination,106 the current vaccination programs “fail to the meet the due process requirements necessary to
protect life”107 as analyzed under existing case law.108 The existing case, to
which the author, James Turner, referred, is the oft-quoted case Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, a United States Supreme Court case that opponents to vaccine choice have cited as the basis for compulsory vaccinations.109 Mr.

101.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-702(d)(4)(A).
102.
Smith, supra note 90, at 277-78.
103.
Sean Colletti, Comment, Taking Account of Partial Exemptions in Vaccination
Law, Policy and Practice, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1341, 1344 (2004).
104.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
105.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
106.
See supra Part II.B.2.
107.
JAMES TURNER, Due Process and the American Constitution, in VACCINE
EPIDEMIC 27, 32 (Louise Kuo Habakus & Mary Holland eds., 2011).
108.
Id.
109.
See, e.g., James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 857 (2002) (discuss-
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Turner, among others, asserts that this dispositive approach to interpreting
Jacobson is flawed. Turner states that “the Supreme Court emphasized that
it was upholding the Massachusetts statute under the ‘necessities of the
case,’ namely, that an epidemic was prevalent and increasing.”110 In the
absence of a health emergency, Turner suggests that compulsory vaccination policies “might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to a particular person in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or
might go so far as what was reasonably required for the safety of the public
. . . .”111 In Jacobson, the petitioner had refused a smallpox vaccination
[during an epidemic] and was subsequently fined a five-dollar penalty.112
Given that the Cambridge ordinance required either vaccination compliance
or the payment of a fine assessed for non-compliance, perhaps the Court’s
holding is not nearly as absolute—in terms of denying personal choices that
relate to vaccinations—as the compulsory vaccine crowd suggests.113
Even supposing that Jacobson stands for the absolute power of the
states to impose compulsory vaccination mandates, the case was decided in
1905. “Since Jacobson, the Supreme Court has decided several cases about
medical intervention, bodily integrity, and sexual autonomy, further articulating what constitutes valid individual liberty interests and the level of
scrutiny a court must apply to laws restricting them.”114 Considering that
the Supreme Court has afforded a great level of deference to the individual
in choices that relate to autonomy, the “Court would view a challenge under
the Fourteenth Amendment to a compulsory vaccination mandate today”
quite differently than it did at the time Jacobson was decided.115
B.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS INVOLVING FAMILY INCEPTION AND BEYOND

The Supreme Court has, with a great degree of faithfulness, upheld individual liberties substantiated in issues involving privacy.116 Drawing on
historical traditions, the Supreme Court has held that the right to marry is
fundamental, and, absent a compelling reason, a state could not interfere
with that right.117 Furthermore, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court
ing how compelled vaccination policies outweigh the minimal risk of death or injury to
individuals).
110.
TURNER, supra note 107, at 35.
111.
Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30 (1905)).
112.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 13-14 (1905).
113.
See Ross, supra note 29, at 280-81.
114.
Mary Holland, Compulsory Vaccination, the Constitution, and the Hepatitis B
Mandate for Infants and Young Children, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 39, 59
(2012).
115.
Id.
116.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 588 (2003).
117.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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addressed the right to reproduce and declared that “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental [rights],”118 and that “[in] our view . . . strict scrutiny
[applies].”119
Notably, the Court has taken a strong pro-family autonomy stance
when states have interfered with a parent’s right to determine the upbringing of her child.120 The Court, recognizing that parents, not the State, were
in a superior position to make decisions about how children are raised, stated:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of
the State to standardize its children . . . . The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.121
In fact, in 2007, the Supreme Court—after finding no intent by Congress to
preclude—cited the reasoning in Pierce v. Society of Sisters as justification
for its holding that parents could pursue a cause of action resulting from
violations of the Individual’s With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) as
pertaining to their child.122 This holding reflects the Court’s recognition for
the degree to which a parent’s interests are intertwined with those of her
child; the injuries a child suffers are simultaneously suffered by the parent.
In Winkleman v. Parma City School District, both the child and his parents
had separate causes of action for the IDEA violations, and the parents were
not merely suing in the stead of their child.123
Furthermore, the Court has further defined the type of control that a
parent has regarding choices that relate to her children.124 In Troxel v.
Granville, a mother (Granville) asserted her authority to limit visitations
between her children and their deceased father’s parents.125 At that time,
Washington state law allowed that “[a]ny person may petition the court for
visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings.”126 Accordingly, the paternal grandparents of the children (the
Troxels) filed a petition seeking expanded visitation rights.127 Initially, the
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Id.
See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (emphasis added).
Winkleman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 529 (2007).
Id. at 529-30.
See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 61 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3)).
Id.
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grandparents prevailed in the state’s lower court upon a finding that they
had standing to petition the court for visitation and because “[t]he Petitioners are part of a large, central, loving family . . . and the Petitioners can
provide opportunities for the children in the areas of cousins and music.”128
The Washington Court of Appeals decided that the Troxels lacked standing
under the statute, but the Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding that
the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon Granville’s fundamental parenting rights.129 When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice
O’Connor wrote that the Washington statute allowed for the court to “disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent,” when a “judge
disagree[s] with the parent’s estimation of the child’s best interests.”130 The
Court found that the statute had extended the state’s power too broadly, and
that:
[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the
State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to
further question the ability of that parent to make the best
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.131
Imagining that the Court had found that the Washington statute was a valid
exercise in the state’s ability to interfere with Granville’s fundamental
rights conjures up a tenuous—but very real—vision of Ira Levin’s state
computer-controlled society in This Perfect Day.132
A review of these holdings demonstrates that the Court will not infringe upon the fundamental parental right to the care, custody, and control
of their children, absent a compelling state interest, because, “[t]he law[] . .
. has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the
best interests of their children.”133 One critic argues that a parent’s ability to
assert exemptions for his unvaccinated children unethically intrudes upon

128.
Id. at 61-62 (citing In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 23 (Wash. 1998)).
129.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 62-63 (2000).
130.
Id. at 67.
131.
Id. at 68-69 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993)).
132.
IRA LEVIN, THIS PERFECT DAY (1970). Levin’s futuristic dystopian novel explored the idea of a “perfect” society in which all people were forbidden from making any
life choices—including decisions about whether to have children and how to raise them—
without first gaining the consent of “UniComp”—the omniscient state-run computer system.
Id.
133.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
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the child’s rights to make health-related decisions for herself.134 Recently,
California Governor Jerry Brown signed legislation that would allow children as young as twelve to obtain the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine
without parental consent.135 Ironically, on the same day, Governor Brown
signed a bill that would make it illegal for teens under the age of eighteen to
use tanning beds.136 The incongruence in the two measures is stunning;
essentially, the State of California will permit young women to obtain—
without parental consent, let alone knowledge—a vaccine, which has generated a host of safety concerns,137 yet the same young woman could not
legally use a tanning bed in the State of California.138 A parent of a young
woman who had used a tanning bed may detect physical clues as to what
her child has been doing and perhaps have a discussion about the safety of
such practices. On the other hand, the parent of a girl who has—
unbeknownst to the parent—received the HPV vaccine, and subsequently
experienced an adverse reaction, may be ill-equipped to seek appropriate
medical attention.
The Supreme Court has indicated a presumption in favor of the parents
of children making important decisions in the interest of the child. The
Court has held that “[t]he law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.”139 This
judicial recognition of a parent’s superior rights to make decisions for her
children reflects the basic presumption of family structures; there would be
little need for family organization if children were capable of making decisions in their best interest (let alone understanding what their best interest
is). Accordingly, the Court has consistently upheld the interests of a child’s
fit parent in making decisions relating to how the child is to be raised.140

134.
See Novak, supra note 81, at 1119 (“Where the child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child’s rights to permit
such an imposition without canvassing his views . . . .”).
135.
Brown Signs California Bill Letting 12-Year-Olds Get HPV Vaccine Without
Parents’
Consent,
FOXNEWS.COM
(Oct.
10,
2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/10/10/brown-signs-california-bill-letting-12-yearolds-get-hpv-vaccine-without/.
136.
Id.
137.
Should Parents Worry About HPV Vaccine?, CNN HEALTH (Jul. 7, 2008),
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-07-07/health/cervical.cancer.vaccine_1_hpv-vaccine-gardasilcervical-cancer?_s=PM:HEALTH.
138.
See Brown Signs California Bill Letting 12-Year-Olds Get HPV Vaccine Without Parents’ Consent, supra note 135.
139.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 602 (1979)).
140.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Amish parents
relying upon their religious beliefs may choose to terminate their children’s formal education
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ABORTION RIGHTS, “ANATOMICAL LANDMARKS,” AND EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE IMPLICATIONS.

Prior to 1821, no state had enacted an anti-abortion statute, nor did any
state criminally prosecute abortion under common law.141 Rather, abortion
laws rapidly emerged in the late 1800s142 and were bolstered in the early
1900s by society’s drive to legislate morality.143 However, the emergence
of a modest national birth control policy, which was effectuated when President John F. Kennedy “add[ed] birth control studies to the agenda of the
federally funded National Institutes of Health,”144 seemed to spark an interest in a spectrum of birth control measures that could keep pace with women’s growing interest in realizing roles beyond that of housewife and mother.145 Federal legislation establishing the rights of women to file sexual discrimination lawsuits, the decision of the Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut,146 the movement by many states to allow abortion on demand
(provided that procedural guidelines were followed),147 and the inception of
the National Organization for Women (NOW) were at work in the forefront
of national issues that led up to the grandfather of all abortion cases: Roe v.
Wade.148
The Roe Court constructed a “trimester” analysis which was designed
to balance the state’s interest in protecting potential life against the interest
of the mother to be free from compelled pregnancy and impending motherhood.149 The timing of Roe was ripe for victory for abortion-rights advocates because the Court had to consider its solidly grounded fundamental
family and procreation privacy rights jurisprudence,150 as well as the emergafter the eighth grade in favor of an immersive education conferred through community
participation).
141.
IRVING J. SLOAN, THE LAW GOVERNING ABORTION, CONTRACEPTION &
STERILIZATION 1 (1988).
142.
Id. at 6.
143.
See, e.g., N.E.H. HULL & PETER CHARLES HOFFER, ROE V. WADE: THE ABORTION
RIGHTS CONTROVERSY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 49 (2001).
144.
Id. at 90.
145.
See generally id. at 90-96.
146.
In Griswold, the Court held that the state could not intrude upon the privacy of
the marital relationship by punishing medical personnel for providing information about and
access to birth control. The case was not decided upon explicit wording in the United States
Constitution; rather Justice Douglas wrote that certain “zones of privacy” were found in the
penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
147.
SLOAN, supra note 141, at 11-12.
148.
See HULL & HOFFER, supra note 143, at 90-96; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
149.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
150.
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that laws that provide fundamental rights of privacy in regards to married couples but deny those rights to
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ing law and societal attitudes in the field of women’s liberation.151 While
the petitioners in Roe argued that the privacy found in the penumbras analysis from Griswold applied,152 the Court instead decided the issue by finding
that a woman had a liberty interest in the decision whether or not to bear a
child, and declared the right to abortion to be fundamental.153 The Court
reasoned:
Maternity, or additional offspring may force upon the
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm
may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed
by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.154
Furthermore, Justice Stewart suggested that a woman’s right to an
abortion should be more rigorously protected than certain other fundamental rights:
Certainly the interest of a woman in giving of her physical
and emotional self during pregnancy and the interests that
will be affected throughout her life by the birth and raising
of a child are of a far greater degree of significance and
personal intimacy than the right to send a child to private
school . . . .155
The decision rendered states powerless to regulate abortion at all in the
first trimester, but states could regulate the safety of abortions during the
second trimester, and could ban abortion at the time that the unborn child

unmarried couples violate the Equal Protection Clause); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (holding that an unwed father—like an unwed mother—has a fundamental liberty
interest in the custody of his children such that statutes that deny unwed fathers custody of
their children violate the Equal Protection Clause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965) (finding that marital privacy regarding birth control falls within the “zones of
privacy” found in the penumbras); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating
that “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race,” and that forced sterilization upon convicts creates an Equal Protection Clause violation); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (finding that parents, and not the state, have
the right to decide how to educate their children).
151.
See HULL & HOFFER, supra note 143.
152.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
153.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-55.
154.
Id. at 153.
155.
Id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224,
227 (D. Conn. 1972)).

22

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 4

had become viable.156 Largely, though, women were free to obtain abortions without state interference because the Supreme Court weighed the
potential burdens to the mother more heavily than the interests of the states.
Nearly twenty years later, when the Court was urged to overturn the
central holding of Roe, the Court declined, citing reliance: “The ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation
has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.”157
While the decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey did not affirm the Court’s “trimester” analysis from Roe—allowing
states to regulate the safety of abortions as pertaining to maternal health—
the Court firmly held that states may not place any “undue burden” on
women seeking abortions.158
These concerns are shared by parents who are left with a vaccinedamaged child.159 In fact, states without a philosophical exemption from
compulsory vaccinations are potentially placing an “undue burden” on parents who may be left holding the bag when their child is damaged by a vaccine. For instance, consider just one of the NVICP listed vaccine-induced
injuries: encephalopathy.160 The NVICP defines encephalopathy as a condition “that is sufficiently severe so as to require hospitalization,” and may
manifest in “[a] significant change in mental status . . . specifically a confusional state or a delirium, or a psychosis.”161 Other symptoms might include
“increased intracranial pressure,” and “decreased or absent response to environment,” among other factors.162 The effects of encephalopathy may be
short-lived with no lingering complication, but for less fortunate families,
the long-term effects of encephalopathy may include, “personality changes,
severe brain damage . . . [or] death.”163
In Roe, the Court cited “psychological harm” as one of the factors that
may face a woman compelled to bear a child.164 While compelled
parenthood may produce psychological harm, it is difficult for people to
comprehend the suffering of parents who lose a child in death. One expert
describes such suffering:
Bereaved parents feel oppressive feelings of failure in their
roles as parents; their inability to prevent their child’s death
156.
Id. at 164.
157.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
158.
Id. at 877-78.
159.
See supra Part II.B.
160.
See HRSA, Vaccine Injury Table, supra note 53.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Charles
Patrick
Davis,
Encephalopathy,
MEDICINENET.COM,
http://www.medicinenet.com/encephalopathy/page4.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2011).
164.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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leads to overwhelming feelings of helplessness and of being violated. Their sense of self diminishes, and they feel
disillusioned, empty and insecure. Parents, looking through
their pain, are disoriented and confused to see that somehow the world continues on even though nothing makes
sense any more. Their instincts to provide for and protect
the child continue after the death, but they are unable to act
on these instincts; stormy nights often find bereaved parents awake, wondering if their child is in a safe, dry
place.165
Parents whose child suffers a vaccine-induced death not only suffer
the loss of their child, but must also likely live with “oppressive feelings of
failure in their roles as parents,”166 when the death is linked to a vaccine to
which they willingly—or grudgingly—consented. Why then, are the concerns facing an unwillingly pregnant woman given greater weight than the
concerns of parents who have chosen to bear children? Perhaps it is because
life is riddled with uncertainty, and accepting the potential for devastation is
simply a cost inherent in becoming a parent? Even so, should the parents of
wanted children not be given the same freedom to make choices that may
diminish that potential?
Suppose instead of death, a family suffers a vaccine injury that renders
their child brain-damaged. If the parents can show that their child’s reaction
falls within what some have characterized as ever-narrowing definitions of
vaccine injury,167 they may receive some compensation. The average award
(based solely upon successful petitioners and total outlays)168 works out to
$786,000. That amount may seem generous; however, the uncertainty of the
true costs to the family may render the award less stunning, as “[t]he financial consequences of child brain damage range from the cost of medical
care to lost wages that will not be felt for years, or decades, in the future.”169 In addition to any award recovered from NVICP, brain-damaged
children may qualify170 for federal assistance via special education pro165.
Donna Lamb, Surviving the Death of a Child, HAND OF THE PENINSULA, 1,
http://www.handsupport.org/newsletters/spring08.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
166.
Id.
167.
See Fisher, Compensating Vaccine Injuries: Are Reforms Needed?, supra note
65.
168.
See HRSA, Statistics Reports, supra note 43.
169.
LEVY PHILLIPS & KONIGSBERG, LLP, http://www.lpklaw.com/child-braindamage.php (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).
170.
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010) (“The term ‘child with a disability’ means a child—(i) with intellectual
disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments,
visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance (referred to in this
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grams administered by their local school district: “The Secretary shall make
grants to States, outlying areas, and freely associated States, and provide
funds to the Secretary of the Interior, to assist them to provide special education and related services to children with disabilities . . . .”171 What these
forms of compensation do not account for is that even with financial assistance, “[m]ental and physical health may be taxed by [the] childcare”172
required of children who may suffer brain damage from an adverse reaction
to a vaccine. One article points out:
Parents of children with disabilities had a greater number
of stressors and a higher number of days during which they
had at least one stressor. They reported having at least one
stressor on 50 percent of the study days compared with 40
percent among the other parents. Parents of children with
disabilities also reported experiencing a greater number of
physical health problems.173
The article further points out that there are resources designed to assist
such families: “[r]espite is critical for family wellness,” yet “it is not an
easy support for many families to access.”174 Absent adequate access to
such help, families may be left to completely shoulder the sort of psychological burden which the Supreme Court held would have violated a woman’s liberty interests if she were denied the right to an abortion.175
Yet, the Court has drawn restrictive lines termed “anatomical landmarks” in terms of a woman’s right to abort her unborn child.176 At issue in
Gonzales v. Carhart was the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.177 The
Act criminalized partial-birth abortions when performed as such:
(1) the term “partial-birth abortion” means an abortion in
which the person performing the abortion—
(A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the
entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the
chapter as ‘emotional disturbance’), orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury,
other health impairments or specific learning disabilities . . . .”).
171.
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1) (2006).
172.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
173.
Rick Nauert, Parental Stress with Special-Needs Children, PSYCH CENT.,
http://psychcentral.com/news/2009/02/19/parental-stress-with-special-needschildren/4219.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
174.
Id.
175.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
176.
See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 148 (2007).
177.
Id.
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case of a breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk
past the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the
purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows
will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and
(B) performs the overt act, other than the completion of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus . . . .178
The Court held that this law was constitutional, rejecting arguments
that the proscribed procedure would leave only the potentially more risky
method available to women, cited to congressional findings, and held that
the banned procedure “will further coarsen society to the humanity of not
only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such life.”179 The Court explained, “[t]he Act
expresses respect for the dignity of human life.”180 The Court found additional justification in finding the law constitutional by considering the reputation-damaging effect the practice has upon the medical community: “‘Partial-birth abortion . . . confuses medical, legal, and ethical duties of physician’s to preserve and promote life . . . .’”181 The Court explained the government has a role ‘“in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical
profession.’”182
The holding from Gonzales indicates that the state’s interest in the
preservation of the “dignity of human life,”183 surpasses a woman’s interest
in obtaining a partial-birth abortion because to allow a child to be nearly
fully delivered before extinguishing its life pushes the ethical boundaries
beyond our comfort. Similarly, then, the same concern should extend to
parents of children who seek to protect the integrity of their child’s life by
choosing not to introduce vaccinations into the child’s vulnerable body.
Furthermore, the “integrity and ethics of the medical profession”184 may
rightly be questioned when there appears to have been some bed-swapping
between two of the largest medicine-related bureaucracies, the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)185 (which determines vaccine poli178.
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
179.
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157 (quoting Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 102).
180.
Id.
181.
Id. at 157 (first ellipsis in original) (quoting Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat.
1202, 1205).
182.
Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997)).
183.
Id.
184.
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157.
185.
Dr. Julie Gerberding Named President of Merck Vaccines, MERCK (Sep. 9,
2011, 1:34 PM), http://www.merck.com/includes/print-friendly.html (on file with author)
(announcing the appointment of former CDC Director, Dr. Julie Gerberding, to the position
of president of Merck Vaccines).
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cy) and the Federal Drug Administration (FDA)186 (which approves vaccines), and the pharmaceutical companies that manufacture the nation’s
vaccine supplies. Suggestions that the relationship may be tainted might be
tenuous, but in the mind of the parent of a vaccine-damaged child, the “integrity and ethics of the medical profession”187 will likely come into question. Furthermore, the CDC does not require that physicians obtain “informed consent” from the parent of a child who is to receive a vaccination;
rather, the agency merely mandates a “Vaccine Information Statement”
(VIS).188 The purpose of providing the VIS to the parent is to “inform vaccine recipients—or their parents or legal representatives—about the benefits
and risks of a vaccine.”189 Presumably, in the interest of conservation, the
CDC does not require that the parent/patient be given a personal copy of the
VIS: “The patient may be offered a permanent (e.g. laminated) copy of the
VIS to read during their visit (instead of their own copy) . . . .”190 Given the
potential for life-altering consequences affiliated with certain vaccines, why
is information about vaccine safety—not to mention the lack of informed
consent—so callously administered? Some critics argue that nothing less
than informed consent is ethical:
The First Principle of the Nuremberg Code is “The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to
exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of
any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or
other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should
have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to
make an understanding and enlightened decision.”191

186.
Ed Silverman, Glaxo Hires Former FDA Chief Counsel Dan Troy, PHARMALOT
(July 22, 2008, 4:19 PM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2008/07/glaxo-hires-former-fdachieeneral-counsel-dan-troy/ (on file with author) (announcing the appointment of former
FDA chief counsel, Dan Troy, as senior vice president and general counsel).
187.
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157.
188.
Fact Sheet for Vaccine Information Statements, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
&
HUM.
SERVICES
CENTERS
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/vis/vis-facts.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
189.
Id.
190.
Id.
191.
Barbara Loe Fisher, The Moral Right to Conscientious, Philosophical and Personal Belief Exemption to Vaccination, NAT’L VACCINE INFO. CENTER (May 2, 1997),
http://www.nvic.org/informed-consent.aspx (making accessible Barbara Loe Fisher’s statement to the National Vaccine Advisory Committee on May 2, 1997).

2012]

BEYOND THE WOMB

27

Such issues call the ethics of the industry into question, particularly for
families who have personally weathered the repercussions of vaccine injury.
The disparity between the treatment of the two groups of parents—
women who choose to have an abortion and parents who have children—
simply doesn’t reflect the reasoning that the Supreme Court has promulgated as justification for upholding abortion rights:
Roe, however, may be seen . . . as a rule (whether or not
mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with
doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection . . . a State’s interest in the protection of life falls
short of justifying any plenary override of individual liberty
claims.192
How much more implicated can “the interests of a woman[/parent] in
giving of her physical and emotional self”193 be than when a parent is left to
raise a child injured by a vaccine? Just as the Court in Roe gave superior
consideration—over state interests—to the interests of a woman compelled
to give birth, that same level of consideration should be given to parents
who might face the stressful task of raising vaccine-damaged children. The
Court has recognized that compelled motherhood can have extreme impacts
upon a woman’s life.194 The establishment of the NVICP is Congress’s less
articulate acknowledgment that national vaccine policy can have an extreme impact upon a family.195
D.

A NEW HYBRID: ABORTION RIGHTS PLUS FAMILY AUTONOMY RIGHTS
EQUALS THE RIGHT TO PHILOSOPHICAL EXEMPTIONS

When the United States Supreme Court took a sharp turn away from
existing religious freedom jurisprudence in Employment Division v.
Smith,196 the Court maneuvered a preservation of the seminal case, Wisconsin v. Yoder,197 by declaring that Yoder involved a hybrid of two fundamental rights.198 Similarly, rights to privacy and family autonomy rights, both
192.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
193.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973) (citing Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp.
224, 227 (D. Conn. 1972)).
194.
Id. at 153.
195.
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3743.
196.
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
197.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
198.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (holding that the regulation in Yoder implicated Amish
parents’ religious freedom and right to raise their children as they deemed proper).
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deemed fundamental, could support an analogous hybrid approach (to vaccination exemption rights) as formulated by the Court in Smith. A merger of
language pulled from the reasoning supporting the decisions in both abortion rights and family autonomy rights cases clearly indicates that parents
are entitled to claim philosophical exemptions from state-mandated vaccination laws.
Considering that a state may not place an “undue burden”199 on a
woman’s right to make a decision in which “psychological harm may be
imminent,”200 the state should likewise not force the undue burden of compulsory vaccination upon parents when psychological harm may be imminent should that child experience an adverse reaction.
Because the Supreme Court has declared that “[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children,”201 states should not
interfere with a parent’s “right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize”202
what choices best suit their children, be it private education or an exemption from vaccinations. Obviously, the Pierce court recognized that state
standardization of children meant that some children/families would lose
something in the process. Such is the case for families who suffer vaccine
injuries.
Certainly fundamental abortion rights and family autonomy rights are
opposite sides of the same coin. Both issues involve matters of privacy and
choosing what is best for the individual or family involved. The Supreme
Court has recognized this concept. In Roe, both Justice Douglas and Justice
Stewart recognized the interconnection between the issues. Writing for the
majority, Justice Douglas stated that “only personal rights that can be
deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ are
included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that
the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.”203 In
his concurrence, Justice Stewart wrote that “[s]everal decisions of this
Court make clear that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”204 Writing a concurring opinion in Casey,
Justice Blackmun said, “[t]hese cases embody the principle that personal
decisions that profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and destiny

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-78 (1992).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
Id.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
Id. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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should be largely beyond the reach of government.”205 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has laid the foundation for a finding that a parent’s right to
not vaccinate her children should be designated fundamental.
V.

CONCLUSION

While states do have a legitimate interest in enforcing compulsory
vaccination requirements, a failure to allow for broadly construed philosophical exemptions unconstitutionally interferes with a parent’s fundamental rights to make decisions that bear the potential to devastatingly impact a
family. A more narrowly tailored approach would be to make vaccinations
compulsory during an outbreak of a particular disease, just as Massachusetts did in 1902,206 bearing in mind that “[t]here is, of course, a sphere
within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will and
rightfully dispute the authority of any human government . . . to interfere
with the exercise of that will.”207 Perhaps instead, as is the case in many
states’ exemption statutes, sequestration of unvaccinated individuals during
outbreaks208 would suffice. Additionally, the practice of requiring “informed refusal”209 would provide the type of procedural safeguards that
would ensure that parents are validly asserting an exemption (as opposed to
acting negligently), and have been made aware of the risks of nonvaccination. As one commentator notes, “[s]tates with a philosophical exemption claim to allow parents to use it for individual vaccines if they so
choose,”210 and “[a] partial exemption system will help to keep parents
from making the drastic decision to exempt their children from all of the
vaccines.”211 This potentially translates into higher levels of vaccination
compliance.
How will the Supreme Court decide if the argument that a parent’s
right to exempt her child from vaccination is fundamental? It is hard to say,
but as one author points out, “[t]hese personal autonomy cases contrast
starkly with Jacobson’s legacy. . . . [T]hey are relevant to how the Supreme
Court would view a challenge . . . to a compulsory vaccination mandate
205.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 927 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
206.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905) (“The authority to determine
for all what ought to be done in such an emergency must have been lodged somewhere or in
some body.”).
207.
Id. at 28.
208.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-873 (2009) (“Pupils who lack documentary proof of immunization shall not attend school during outbreak periods of communicable
immunization-preventable diseases . . . .”).
209.
See Silverman, supra note 29.
210.
Colleti, supra note 103, at 1370.
211.
Id. at 1380.
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today.”212 A Supreme Court decision that favors parental control of this
very private decision would comport with the Court’s existing jurisprudence and would effectively eliminate the current existing Equal Protection
Clause concerns.213
SAMANTHA M. HARDT*

212.
Holland, supra note 114, at 59.
213.
See Novak, supra note 81, at 1115.
* To my husband, Bill: your support and patience has often been my motivational
sustenance. I cannot thank you enough. To my sons, Bailey and Ethan: I am so proud that
both of you are not only incredibly unique, but also have the good sense to embrace your
individuality. To my parents and siblings: while it's true that we cannot pick our family, had
I the choice, I'd take the whole crazy lot of you all over again. Soli Deo gloria - and - ave
atque vale!

